Abstract-Recently, Yang et al. proposed a three-party encrypted key exchange protocol (3PAKE) which is based on Elliptic curve cryptography. Their 3PAKE protocol is efficient because it requires less computation cost and less communication cost, which is well suitable for mobile commerce environments. However, Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol is susceptible to parallel attacks and impersonation attacks. We presented an enhancement to resolve such security problems. Detailed analyses show that our proposed protocol is a secure 3PAKE protocol and more efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication network has brought convenience to people. However, the communication channel could be eavesdropped and the message transmitted could be modified. Impersonation attacks could be mounted in the open environment. Bellovin and Merritt [1] developed a two-party password-based authentication key exchange (2PAKE) protocol in which party authentication and key exchange techniques always are adopted. Two parties in communication share a password, authenticate each other and obtain a common ephemeral session key [1] . Since then, many 2PAKE protocols are proposed [2, 3] .
However, 2PAKE protocols have the poor scalability. If 2PAKE protocols are applied in a multi-party environment, there must be the high maintenance cost problems. Because 2 PAKE protocols require each pair to share one password, in order to communicate with many parties, each party has to remember a larger number of passwords. Much research has been made to generalize 2PAKE protocols to 3PAKE protocols. 3PAKE protocols can be classified into two categories: with password and without password. In a 3PAKE password-based protocol [4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13] , every party shares only a single password with a trusted server which provides authentication services for the pair of parties, thus the parties can authenticate each other and share an authenticated session key. Only valid parties can decrypt message to derive correct session keys. In 3PAKE password-based protocols, each party does not need to remember and store multiple passwords. The other category of 3PAKE protocols don't use any password, but apply symmetric key cryptosystems such as DES, AES etc or public key cryptosystems [14, 15, 16] . In the second 3PAKE protocols, encryption [14, 15, 16] or signature [18] techniques are used as the authentication methods. Such 3PAKE protocols often lead to high computation cost. 3PAKE protocols can also be classified into two classes: without servers [18] and with a server. The former is a special case of multi-party key agreement protocols. In 3PAKE protocols with a server, two parties can cooperate to produce a common session key with the help of the server. In the following, the protocols to be discussed are 3PAKE protocols with a server.
A research direction in 3PAKE public key cryptosystem based protocols aims to improve the efficiency. Based upon Schnorr's digital signature scheme [17] , Chen et al. [15] proposed a 3PAKE protocol with fewer rounds. But Chen et al. ' s protocol still has the high computation cost and communication cost. Moreover, their protocol cannot resist against stolen-verifier attacks [16] . Yang et al. [16] use elliptic curve cryptography to present an enhancement to Chen et al.'s 3PAKE protocol. Their proposed protocol requires smaller transmitted message size and less communication times. But Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol suffers from unknown key-share attacks [19] . An improvement on it is proposed in [19] . However, the proposed protocol is not consistent to Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol. Because the proposed protocol applies password, smart card, and the public key cryptosystem, it is not a 3PAKE protocol only based on public/secret key cryptosystem. In fact, the 3PAKE protocols with password authentication will suffer from some security threats. For example, weak passwords always incur the offline guessing attack, the online guessing attack and the online undetectable guessing attack [5, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 12] .
Assume A and B are two honest entities and S is the server which help A and B to build a session key. In the 3PAKE protocol, the server is trustworthy. A 3PAKE protocol should satisfy the following security attributes [13, 18, 20, 21] : (1) Known-Key Security. After each execution of the 3PAKE protocol, A and B can generate a unique secret session key. Each session key of one execution of the 3PAKE protocol is independent of that one generated in another execution of the 3PAKE protocol. Moreover, the compromise of one session key should not lead to compromise of other session keys.
(2) Forward Secrecy. If secret keys of the three parties including the server are compromised, the secrecy of previously established session keys should not be affected. (3) Key-Compromise Impersonation Resilience. Even if an adversary has corrupted one party, e.g. A, and obtained A's secret key, the adversary still can not impersonate the other party, e.g. B, and communicate with a party C. (4) Unknown Key-Share Resilience. After the protocol run, one party, say A, believes that she shares a key with a party, say B, but while B mistakenly believe that the key is shared with another party, say C. Therefore, a secure 3PAKE protocol should resist against the unknown key-share attacks. (5) Key Control. The key should be determined jointly by both the parties A and B. Even the server cannot decide the session key.
In the paper, we show further analysis on the security of Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol. We found that an adversary can impersonate the session initiator to request the communication with other parties and can also impersonate the session responder to build the communication with the initiator. In addition, Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol suffers from parallel attacks.
To overcome those security weaknesses, we propose an enhanced 3PAKE protocol based on Yang et al.'s scheme. The proposed protocol using Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) inherits the advantages of Yang et al.'s scheme. We integrated the time stamp and the identities of the sender into the hash function, the proposed protocol removes the security weaknesses of Yang et al.'s scheme. Detailed cryptanalysis demonstrates that our 3PAKE protocol can satisfy all the security properties which a secure 3PAKE protocol posses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol using ECC for mobile-commerce environments. In Section 3, we analyze the security flaws of their protocol. In Section 4, an enhanced 3PAKE scheme is proposed. In Section 5, we analyze the security of the proposed 3PAKE protocol. Finally, conclusion will be given in Section 6.
II. REVIEW OF YANG ET AL.'S 3PAKE PROTOCOL Now, we briefly review Yang et al.'s three-party authenticated key exchange protocol using ECC for mobile-commerce environments. Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol is divided into two phases: the initialization phase and the authenticated key exchange phase. And the protocol is involved with three roles: the party A, the party B and a trusted server S.
First, we introduce some notations used throughout the paper in Table 1 . 
be a symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm, where k is the symmetric key.
In the registration phase, the parties A and B register to the server S to generate their private/public key pairs The authenticated key exchange phase can be depicted as follows. R1 A →B: {ID A , Request } A:
{ID B , Response} B:
III. WEAKNESSES OF YANG ET AL.'S 3PAKE PROTOCOL Yang et al claimed that their scheme [19] is secure. However, we show that Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol still suffers from some attacks.
A. Impersonation-of-initiator attacks
Any adversary C can impersonate A to request the communication with B. The initialization phase is the same as that in Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol. The authenticated key exchange phase with C can be described as follows.
Finally, B will mistake C for A and communicate with C by using the session key SK.
B. Impersonation-of-responder attacks
Any adversary E can also impersonate B to accomplish the session key exchange with A. During the authenticated key exchange phase, E impersonates the party B to share a session key with the party A. The whole phase is composed of three rounds. R1 A →B: {ID A , Request } A:
Thus, A will mistake C for B and communicate with C by using the session key SK. In addition, if the adversary has already intercepted many enough communication message flows, the adversary can require more enough responses from the server by replay attacks. Thus, the server will be clogged by the seemingly legitimate requests. In fact, the legal parties cannot build up a session key in time without the server's help.
C. Parallel attacks

IV. THE ENHANCED 3PAKE PROTOCOL USING ECC
To overcome the security flaws of Yang et al.'s protocol [19] , we propose an improved 3PAKE protocol. The enhanced 3PAKE protocol concerns three parties: party A, party B and server S. The protocol is composed of two phases: the initialization phase and the authenticated key exchange phase.
The initialization phase is the similar to that one in Yang et al.'s protocol. But, all the parties' public keys are built in PKI. The parties A and B need not register to the server. Here, we omit the detailed description of the initialization phase. The authenticated key exchange phase still consists of three rounds.
Round 1
A executes the following steps.
Step 1. Select a random integer
Step 2. Compute the key ) , (
Step 3. Select a random Step 5. Send (ID A ,Request) and (ID A , C AS , R A ) to B and S, respectively. The message Request denotes a request that A asks B to share a session key.
Round 2
After B receives the message (ID A , Request), B performs the following steps.
Step 1. Select a random integer Step 2. Compute the key ) , (
Step 3. Select a random Step 4. Determine the time B T and encrypt ) , , , , (
Step 5. Send (ID B , Response) and (ID B , C BS , R B ) to B and S, respectively. The message Response denotes a response that B accepts A's request.
Round 3
After S receives the message (ID A , C AS , R A ) and (ID B , C BS , R B ), S performs the following steps.
Step 1. Check if the time stamp A T and B T are valid.
If they are valid, S computes the two keys ) , (
Step 2. Use Ax k and Bx k as the decryption key to decrypt the two cipher texts ) ( ) , , , , (
Step 
Step 5. Send C SA and C SB to A and B, respectively.
After A receives C SA , A performs the following steps to accomplish the session key exchange.
Step A-1. Decrypt C SA and obtain ) ( ) , , , , (
Step A-2. Check if S T is valid and the decrypted A R is the same as the selected A R in Round 1. If they are both the same and the identity message ID S is valid, A confirms that B has been authenticated by S. A computes the session key Similarly, after B receives C SB , B performs the following steps to accomplish the session key exchange.
Step B-1. Decrypt C SB and obtain ) ( ) , , , , (
V. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSES
In this section, we give the performance and the security analyses of the proposed 3PAKE protocol.
A. Security analyses
We analyze the security of the enhanced 3PAKE scheme. The enhanced version inherits the security properties of Yang et al.'s 3PAKE protocol [19] . The proposed scheme is secure against man-in-the-middle attack, outsider attack and stolen-verifier attack. For the detailed analysis, see [16] .
In the following, we first show the enhanced protocol can resist against the attacks in Section 4 and removes the security weaknesses of Yang et al.'s protocol.
(1)Resistance to the impersonation-of-initiator attack
Suppose that an adversary C impersonates A to request the communication with B. As in Section 3.1, C selects a random integer Therefore, our proposed protocol can resist against the impersonation-of-initiator attack.
(2) Resistance to the impersonation-of-responder attack
Suppose that an adversary C impersonates B to respond with A. As mentioned in Section 3.1, although C can compute However, the decrypted time stamp A T is different from the received time stamp ′ A T . Thus, S can confirm that the initiation request from the adversary is not valid. So, the replay attacks as an initiator intending to fool the server can be detected.
Likewise, assume that the adversary tries to replay B's response. A similar analysis demonstrates that S can confirm that the respond from the adversary is not valid. So, the replay attacks as a responder intending to fool the server can also be detected.
Therefore, the replay attack is infeasible for the enhanced 3PAKE scheme.
Suppose that the adversary C intercepts the message (ID A , C AS , R A ) and (ID B , C BS , R B ) to S. C sends C AS and C BS to A and B, respectively. According to Round 3 of our protocol, A decrypts C AS and tries to get ) , , , , (
Since is not from the server S. As for the party B's case, we can make a similar detailed analysis as above-mentioned. Moreover, B can also affirm that (ID S , C BS ) is not from the server S.
Next, we show that the proposed 3PAKE protocol holds the following security properties:
( We summarize the functionality of the proposed scheme and make comparisons with Yang et al.'s protocol in Table 2 . It demonstrates that our schemes can achieve the essential requirements for 3PAKE.
B. Performance analyses
Compared with other 3PAKE protocols in the literature, Yang et al.'s protocol [19] has less computation costs and is efficient. If the size of q used in the ECC of the protocol is 160 bits. The cipher text size of the symmetric encryption/decryption AES is 128 bits. And the identity size if 80bit. Then, the total message size of Yang et al.'s protocol is 1152 bits (In [19] , the message size of each party's identity is not concerned). However, in our protocol, the message flow from the party A(B) to the server S does not include the identity ID B (ID A ) and the message from the server to the party A(B) does not include the identity ID A (ID B ) . Therefore, the transmitted message size is reduced to 832 bits.
The computation times of the proposed protocol is the same as that of Yang et al.'s protocol. If we ignore the computation costs of symmetric encryption and hash function, the total computation costs of A and B are 5PM, where PM means point multiplication. The total computation costs of the server S are 2PM.
From the above (also see Table 3 ), the proposed 3PAKE protocol is more efficient.
Besides, it is claimed that the server must store many public keys of the parties [19] in such 3PAKE protocols as [16] . However, it is not true in the proposed 3PAKE protocol. Since every party holds its public key certificate in PKI and does not register to the server, the server can obtain the information of the parties' public key from PKI which will not increase the server's workload. VI. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have shown that Yang et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the impersonate attacks and parallel attacks. We propose an enhanced three party key exchange protocol based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. We introduce the time stamp to keep the authentication session key exchange fresh. The improved scheme removes the weakness of Yang et al.'s protocol. The analyses show that the proposed protocol is secure on the assumption of CDHP and ECDLP. In addition, the enhanced protocol is more efficient than Yang et al.'s protocol.
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